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Abstract Robots are increasingly expected to perform
tasks in complex environments. To this end, engineers
provide them with processing architectures that are based
on models of human information processing. In contrast to
traditional models, where information processing is typi-
cally set up in stages (i.e., from perception to cognition to
action), it is increasingly acknowledged by psychologists
and robot engineers that perception and action are parts of
an interactive and integrated process. In this paper, we
present HiTEC, a novel computational (cognitive) model
that allows for direct interaction between perception and
action as well as for cognitive control, demonstrated by
task-related attentional inﬂuences. Simulation results show
that key behavioral studies can be readily replicated. Three
processing aspects of HiTEC are stressed for their impor-
tance for cognitive robotics: (1) ideomotor learning of
action control, (2) the inﬂuence of task context and atten-
tion on perception, action planning, and learning, and (3)
the interaction between perception and action planning.
Implications for the design of cognitive robotics are
discussed.
Keywords Integrated processes   Perception–action
interaction   Computational modeling   Cognitive
robotics   Common coding   Ideomotor learning
Introduction
Robots are increasingly expected to autonomously fulﬁll a
variety of tasks and duties in real-world environments that
are constantly changing. In order to cope with these
demands, robots cannot rely on predeﬁned rules of
behavior or ﬁxed sets of perceivable objects or action
routines. Rather, they need to be able to learn how to
segregate and recognize novel objects (e.g., Kraft et al.
2008), how to perceive their own movements (e.g., Fitz-
patrick and Metta 2003), and what actions can be per-
formed on objects in order to achieve certain effects (e.g.,
Montesano et al. 2008).
In this ultimate robot engineering challenge, the nature of
perception, action, and cognition plays an important role.
Traditionally, these domains are assumed to reﬂect different
stages of information processing (e.g., Donders 1868;
Neisser1967;Norman1988):ﬁrst,objectsareperceivedand
recognized; subsequently, based on the current situation,
task, and goal, the optimal action is determined; and ﬁnally,
the selected action is prepared and executed. However, new
robot architectures increasingly recognize the beneﬁts of
integration across these domains. Some roboticists have
focused on creating (perceptually deﬁned) anticipations that
guide action selection and motor control (e.g., Hoffmann
2007;Ziemkeetal.2005).Othersstresstheimportanceofthe
acquisition and use of affordances (after Gibson 1979)i n
navigation (e.g., Ug ˘ur and S ¸ahin 2010), action selection
(e.g., Cos-Aguilera et al. 2004; Kraft et al. 2008), and imi-
tation (e.g., Fitzpatrick and Metta 2003). Also, some
approaches propose active perception strategies (e.g.,
Hoffmann 2007; Lacroix et al. 2006; Ognibene et al. 2008)
thatincludeepistemicsensingactions(e.g.,eyemovements)
that actively perceive features necessary for object recog-
nition or for the planning of further actions.
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DOI 10.1007/s10339-011-0408-xIn our laboratory, we study perception and action in
human performance. Findings in behavioral and neuro-
cognitive studies have shed new light on the interaction
between perception and action, indicating that these pro-
cesses are not as separate and stage-like as has been pre-
sumed. First, features of perceived objects (such as
location, orientation, and size) seem to inﬂuence actions
directly and beyond cognitive control, as illustrated by
stimulus-response compatibility phenomena, such as the
Simon effect (Simon and Rudell 1967). This suggests that
there is a direct route from perception to action that can
bypass cognition. Second, in monkeys, neural substrates
(i.e., so-called mirror neurons) have been discovered that
are active both when the monkey performs a particular
action and when it perceives the same action carried out by
another monkey or human (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004).
This suggests that common representations exist for action
planning and action perception. Finally, behavioral studies
show that, in humans, action planning can actually inﬂu-
ence object perception (Fagioli et al. 2007; Wykowska
et al. 2009), suggesting that perceptual processes and
action processes overlap in time.
In order to integrate these ﬁndings, we have developed a
novel cognitive architecture that allows for the simulation
of a variety of behavioral phenomena. We believe that our
computational model includes processing aspects of human
perception, action, and cognition that may be of special
interest to designers of cognitive robots.
In this paper, we argue that in addition to representations
that include both perceptual and action-related features
(e.g., Wo ¨rgo ¨tter et al. 2009), perception, and action may
also be intertwined with respect to their processes. First, we
discuss the theoretical foundation of our work (the Theory
of Event Coding: TEC) and describe our recently devel-
oped computational model, called HiTEC (Haazebroek
et al. submitted). Then, we discuss a number of simulations
of behavioral phenomena that illustrate the principles of the
processing architecture underlying HiTEC. Finally, we
discuss the wider implications of our approach for the
design of cognitive robotics.
HiTEC
Theory of event coding
The theoretical basis of our approach is the Theory of
Event Coding (TEC, Hommel et al. 2001), a general the-
oretical framework addressing how perceived events (i.e.,
stimuli) and produced events (i.e., actions) are cognitively
represented and how their representations interact to gen-
erate perceptions and action plans. TEC claims that stimuli
and actions are represented in the same way and by using
the same ‘‘feature codes’’. These codes refer to the distal
features of objects and events in the environment, such as
shape, size, distance, and location, rather than to proximal
features of the sensations elicited by stimuli (e.g., retinal
location or auditory intensity). For example, a haptic sen-
sation on the left hand and a visual stimulus on the left both
activate the same distal code representing ‘‘left’’.
Feature codes can represent the properties of a stimulus
in the environment just as well as the properties of a
response—which, after all, is a perceivable stimulus event
itself. This theoretical assumption is derived from ideo-
motor theory (James 1890; see Stock and Stock 2004, for a
historical overview), which presumes that actions are
cognitively represented in terms of their perceivable
effects. According to the ideomotor principle, when one
executes a particular action, the motor pattern is automat-
ically associated to the perceptual input representing the
action’s effects (action effect learning: Elsner and Hommel
2001). Based on these action effect associations, people
can subsequently plan and control (Hommel 2009) a motor
action by anticipating its perceptual effects, that is, (re-)
activate a motor pattern by intentionally (re-)activating the
associated feature codes. Thus, stimuli and actions are
represented in a common representational medium (Prinz
1990). Furthermore, stimulus perception and action plan-
ning are considered to be similar processes: both involve
activating feature codes that represent external events.
Finally, TEC stresses the role of task context in stimulus
and response coding. In particular, the responsiveness of
feature codes to activation sources is modulated according
to the task or goals at hand (the intentional weighting
principle). For example, if the task is to grasp an object,
features codes representing features relevant for grasping
(such as the object’s shape, size, location, and orientation)
will be enhanced, while feature codes representing irrele-
vant features (such as the object’s color or sound) will be
attenuated.
In our work, we address how these principles may be
computationally realized. To this end, we have developed a
computational model, called HiTEC, and tested its per-
formance against empirical data from human studies on
various types of perception–action interactions (Haazebroek
et al. submitted). In this paper, two simulations are descri-
bed, illustrating the aspects that are of particular relevance
for information processing in cognitive robotics.
HiTEC’s structure and representations
HiTEC is implemented as a connectionist network model
that uses the basic building blocks of parallel distributed
processing (PDP; e.g., Rumelhart et al. 1986). In a PDP
model, processing occurs through the interactions of a
number of interconnected elements called units. Units may
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Each unit has an activation value indicating local activity.
Processing occurs by propagating activity through the
network, that is, by propagating activation from one unit to
the other, via weighted connections. When a connection
between two units is positively weighted, the connection is
excitatory and the units will increase each other’s activa-
tion. When the connection is negatively weighted, it is
inhibitory and the units will reduce each other’s activation.
Processing starts when one or more units receive some sort
of external input. Gradually, unit activations will change
and propagate through the network while interactions
between units control the ﬂow of processing. Some units
are designated output units. When the activation of any one
of these units reaches a certain threshold, the network is
said to produce the corresponding output.
In HiTEC, the elementary units are codes that may be
connected and are contained within maps (HiTEC’s mod-
ules). Codes within the same map compete for activation
by means of lateral inhibitory connections. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, maps are organized into three levels: the sensory-
motor level, the feature level, and the task level. Each level
will now be discussed in more detail.
Sensory-motor level
The primate brain encodes perceived objects in a distrib-
uted fashion; different features are processed and repre-
sented across different cortical maps (e.g., DeYoe and Van
Essen 1988). In HiTEC, different perceptual modalities
(e.g., visual, auditory, tactile, proprioceptive) and different
dimensions within each modality (e.g., visual color and
shape, auditory location and pitch) are processed and rep-
resented in different sensory maps. Each sensory map
contains a number of sensory codes that are responsive to
speciﬁc sensory features (e.g., a speciﬁc color or a speciﬁc
pitch). Note that Fig. 1 shows only the sensory maps that
are relevant for modeling the Simon effect (Simulation 2 in
the Simulations section): auditory pitch, auditory location,
and haptic location. However, other speciﬁc instances of
the model may include other sensory maps as well (e.g.,
visual maps).
The sensory-motor level also contains motor codes,
referring to more or less speciﬁc movements (e.g., the
muscle contractions that produce the movement of the hand
pressing a certain key). Although motor codes could also
be organized in multiple maps, in the present version of
HiTEC, we consider only one basic motor map with a set
of motor codes.
Feature level
TEC’s notion of ‘‘feature codes’’ is captured by codes that
are connected to and thus grounded in both sensory codes
and motor codes. Crucially, the same (distal) feature code
(e.g., ‘‘left’’) can be connected to multiple sensory codes
(e.g., ‘‘left haptic location’’ and ‘‘left auditory location’’).
Thus, information from different sensory modalities and
dimensions is combined in one feature code representation.
Although feature codes are considered to arise from expe-
rience, in the present HiTEC simulations, we assume the
existence of a set of feature codes (and their connections to
sensory codes) to bootstrap the process of extracting senso-
rimotor regularities in interactions with the environment.
Task Level
Sensory-motor Level
Haptic
Feature Level
Location
Left Right
Location
Left Right
Auditory
Motor Codes
M1 M2
Pitch
High Low
Other
Key
Location
Left Right
T1 T2
Pitch
High Low
Motor
Fig. 1 HiTEC architecture as
used for simulation of the
Simon effect (see ‘‘Simulations
section’’). Codes reside in maps
on different levels and are
connected by excitatory
associations. Solid lines denote
ﬁxed weights, dashed lines are
connections with learned
weights. Sensory codes receive
modulated excitation from
feature codes, denoted by the
open arrows
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The task level contains generic task codes that reﬂect
alternative ways to wire and weigh existing representations
to prepare for and carry out a particular task. Task codes
connect to both the feature codes that represent stimuli and
the feature codes that represent responses, in correspon-
dence with the current task context.
Associations
In HiTEC, codes are associated. Some are considered
innate or reﬂecting prior experience (depicted as solid lines
in Fig. 1), others are learned during the simulation
(depicted as dashed lines in Fig. 1). This will be elaborated
in the next subsection.
HiTEC’s processes
In general, codes can be stimulated, which results in an
increase in their activation level. Gradually, activation will
ﬂow toward other codes through the connections. Note that
connections are bidirectional (except for the learned feature
code—motor code associations), which results in activation
ﬂowing back and forth between sensory codes, feature
codes, and task codes and activation ﬂowing toward motor
codes. In addition, codes within the same map inhibit each
other. Together, this results in a global competition
mechanism in which all codes participate from the ﬁrst
processing cycle to the last.
Ideomotor learning
Associations between feature codes and motor codes are
explicitly learned as follows. A random motor code is acti-
vated (comparable to the spontaneous ‘‘motor babbling’’
behavior of newborns) ﬁrst. This leads to a change in the
environment (e.g., the left hand suddenly touches an object)
that is registered by sensory codes. Activation propagates
from sensory codes toward feature codes. Subsequently, the
system forms associations between the active feature codes
and the active motor code. The weight change of these
associations depends on the level of activation of both the
motor code and the feature codes during learning.
Action planning
Once associations between motor codes and feature codes
exist, they can be used to select and plan actions. Planning an
action is realized by activating the feature codes that corre-
spond to its perceptual effects and by propagating their acti-
vation toward the associated motor codes. Initially, multiple
motor codes may become active as they typically fan out
associations to multiple feature codes. However, some motor
codes will have more associated features and some of the
associations between motor codes and feature codes may be
strongerthan others. In time, the network converges toward a
state where only one motor code is strongly activated, which
leads to the selection of that motor action.
Task preparation
In behavioral experiments, participants typically receive a
verbal instruction of the task. In HiTEC, a verbal task
instruction is assumed to directly activate the respective fea-
turecodes.Thecognitivesystemconnectsthesefeaturecodes
totaskcodes.Whenthemodelreceivesseveralinstructionsto
responddifferentlytovarious stimuli,differenttaskcodes are
recruited and maintained for the various options. Due to the
mutual inhibitory links between these task codes, they will
compete with each other during the task. Currently, the asso-
ciationsbetweenfeaturecodesandtaskcodesaresetbyhand.
Responding to stimuli
When a stimulus in an experimental trial is presented, its
sensory features will activate a set of feature codes
allowing activation to propagate toward one or more task
codes, which were already associated during task prepa-
ration. Competition takes place between feature codes,
between task codes, and between motor codes, simulta-
neously. Once any one of the motor codes is activated
strongly enough, it leads to the execution of the respective
motor response to the presented stimulus. In our simula-
tions, this marks the end of a trial. In general, the passing of
activation between codes along their connections is iterated
for a number of cycles, which allows for the simulation of
reaction time (i.e., number of cycles from stimulus onset to
response selection) until the activation level of any one of
the motor code reaches a set threshold value.
Neural network implementation
All HiTEC codes—sensory codes, motor codes, task codes,
and feature codes alike—are implemented as generic units
with an activation value bound between 0.0 and 1.0.
Stimulus presentation is simulated by setting the external
input values for the sensory codes. In addition, codes
receive input from other, connected codes. In sum, their
activation level is updated each processing cycle according
to the following function:
Aðt þ 1Þ¼ 1   d ðÞ   AðtÞþð Ext þ Exc þ BgÞ
  1   AðtÞ ðÞ þ Inh   AðtÞ
Here, A(t) denotes the activation of node at time t, d is a
decay term, Ext is its external input (sensory codes only),
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additive background noise, and Inh is its inhibitory input.
Note that we ﬁrst compute all input values to all codes and
then update their respective activation values, resulting in
(simulated) synchronous updating. Ideomotor weights (i.e.,
weights of connections between feature codes and motor
codes) are acquired during learning trials, using the
following Hebbian learning rule:
wjkðt þ 1Þ¼ð 1   dÞ wjkðtÞþLR   ActjðtÞ  ActkðtÞ
  1   wjkðtÞ

Here, wij denotes the weight between nodes j and k at
time t, d is a decay term, LR is the learning rate, and Actj
and Actk refer to the activation levels at time t of nodes
j and k, respectively.
Note that we register a stimulus (or action effect) by
simply providing input values to the relevant sensory
code(s). In a real robotic setup, these sensory codes could
be grounded in the environment, either by deﬁning this
a priori or by generating the sensory codes by means of
unsupervised clustering techniques (e.g., the category for-
mation phase in Montesano et al. 2008). Also note that, in
principle, our model is not restricted to any number or type
of sensory codes, as long as one can ﬁnd a reasonable way
to ground their stimulation in actual (robotic) sensor val-
ues. In simulations, we use speciﬁc instances of the model
that include only those codes we need for the simulation at
hand. Nothing, however, prohibits us from including other
codes as well. The fact that only those codes that are
connected to higher level feature and task codes (resulting
from the task internalization) receive top-down enhance-
ment makes that only a selection of available codes matter
for further processing and other sensory stimulation is to be
ignored (unless strongly salient). Also note that the time
dimension is actually of value to us. Rather than computing
a perception–action mapping or function as fast as possi-
ble—as is common in robotics algorithms—taking more
time for a computation actually reﬂects the (cognitive or
perception–action related) effort needed for the task at
hand. Consequently, apart from accuracy scores, we also
obtain reaction times that vary as a function of the difﬁ-
culty of the task. For further computational details, we refer
to Haazebroek et al. (submitted).
Simulations
The HiTEC computational model has been tested against a
variety of behavioral phenomena. Three processing aspects
of the model are of particular interest: (1) ideomotor
learning of action control, (2) the inﬂuence of task context
and attention on both perception and action planning, and
(3) the interaction between perception and action planning.
For the purpose of this paper, these processing aspects are
illustrated by simulating two behavioral studies: a study on
response-action effect compatibility, conducted by Kunde
et al. (2004) and the Simon task (Simon and Rudell 1967).
We now elaborate on these paradigms and discuss the
results of the simulations in HiTEC.
Simulation 1
In earlier studies (e.g., Elsner and Hommel 2001), it has
been shown that people automatically learn associations
between motor actions and their perceptual effects. An
experiment by Kunde et al. (2004) demonstrates that per-
formance is also affected by the compatibility between
responses and novel (auditory) action effects. In this
experiment, participants had to respond to the color of a
visual stimulus by pressing a key forcefully or softly. The
key presses were immediately followed by a loud or soft
tone. For one group of participants, responses were fol-
lowed by a compatible action effect; the loudness of the
tone matched the response force (e.g., a loud tone appeared
after a forceful key press). In the other group of partici-
pants, the relationship between actions and action effects
was incompatible (e.g., a soft tone appeared after a forceful
key press). If the intensity of an action (e.g., a forceful
response) was compatible with the intensity of the action
effect (e.g., a loud tone), then responses were faster than if
the intensity of the action and its effect were incompatible.
Given that the tones did not appear before the responses
were executed, this observation suggests that the novel, just
acquired action effects were anticipated and considered in
the response selection process.
In HiTEC, this experiment is simulated using the model
as depicted in Fig. 2. Here, visual colors, auditory inten-
sity, and haptic intensity are coded by their respective
sensory codes. At the feature level, generic intensity fea-
ture codes exist that code for both auditory and haptic
intensity. The motor codes refer to the soft and forceful key
presses, respectively. The bindings between feature codes
and task codes follow the task instructions: red is to be
responded to by a strong key press, green by a weak key
press. As an equivalent of the behavioral study, we allow
the model to learn the relationship between key presses and
their perceptual effects. This is realized by randomly
activating one of the two motor codes (i.e., pressing the key
softly or forcefully), registering their sensory effects (i.e.,
both the key press and the tone) by activating the respective
sensory codes, and propagating activation toward the fea-
ture codes. As a result, the active motor code and the active
feature codes become (more strongly) associated. Thus,
ideomotor learning takes place; actions are associated with
their effects.
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result in simultaneous activation of both ‘‘strong’’ and
‘‘weak’’ feature codes. Moreover, these feature codes
inhibit each other. As a result, associations learned between
feature codes and motor codes are weaker (and less spe-
ciﬁc) than in trials with compatible action effects. As these
associations (co-)determine the processing speed during
experimental trials, group differences in reaction time
arise: 24.16 cycles (SD = 0.20) for the compatible group
and 30.64 cycles (SD = 4.10) for the incompatible group.
These results ﬁt well with available behavioral data as
shown in Fig. 3. Thus, regular and compatible action
effects allow for faster anticipation of a motor action
resulting in faster responses to stimuli in the environment
than when action effects are incompatible.
Crucially, participants in behavioral studies typically
receive a task instruction before performing practice trials.
This is simulated by internalizing the task instruction as
feature code—task code connections already before per-
forming the ideomotor learning. As a consequence, acti-
vation also propagates from the haptic intensity sensory
codes to the ‘‘Key’’ feature code to the task codes—and
back—during ideomotor learning, resulting in a top-down
enhancement of the haptic intensity sensory codes as
compared to the auditory intensity sensory codes. While
both haptic intensity and auditory intensity sensory codes
receive equal external stimulation from the environment,
haptic intensity comes to determine the learned connection
weights, where auditory intensity only moderates this
process. Thus, the task instruction not only speciﬁes the
actual S-R mappings that reﬂect the appropriate responses
to the relevant stimulus features, it also conﬁgures the
model in such a way that ‘‘most attention is paid’’ to those
action effect features in the environment that matter for the
current task. Indeed, additional action effects (i.e., the
auditory intensity in this task) do not escape processing
completely (hence the compatibility effect), but their
inﬂuence is strongly limited as compared to the main action
effect dimension (i.e., the haptic intensity). This illustrates
the role of task context and attention in ideomotor learning
of action control.
Simulation 2
The canonical example of stimulus-response compatibility
effects is the Simon task. In this task, the participant per-
forms manual, spatially deﬁned responses (e.g., pressing a
left or right key) to a nonspatial feature of a stimulus (e.g.,
the pitch of a tone). Importantly, the location of the stim-
ulus varies randomly. Even though stimulus location is
irrelevant for the response choice, performance is facili-
tated when stimulus location corresponds spatially to the
correct response. Conversely, performance is impaired
when stimulus location corresponds spatially to the other,
not to be chosen response.
The Simon task is simulated in HiTEC using the model
as depicted in Fig. 1. There are sensory codes for auditory
pitch levels, auditory locations, and haptic locations. The
motor codes refer to the left key press and the right key
press motoric responses, respectively. At the feature level,
generic pitch feature codes as well as generic location
codes are included, as is a general ‘‘Key’’ code that allows
the system to code for all key-related features in a simple
way.
Task Level
Sensory-motor Level
Haptic
Feature Level
Intensity
Force Weak
Auditory
Intensity
Loud Soft
Visual
Motor Codes
M1 M2
Color
Red Green
Other
Sound Key
Intensity
Strong Weak
T1 T2
Color
Red Green
Motor
Fig. 2 HiTEC architecture as
used for simulation of the
experiment by Kunde et al.
(2004). Both auditory intensity
and haptic intensity project to
the general intensity feature
dimension
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used both for encoding (egocentric) stimulus location (i.e.,
they are connected to auditory location sensory codes) and
for encoding (egocentric) response location (i.e., they are
connected to haptic location sensory codes). When a tone
stimulus is presented, auditory sensory codes are activated,
activation propagates gradually toward pitch and location
feature codes, toward task codes and (again) toward loca-
tion feature codes. Over time, the motor codes also become
activated until one of the motor codes reaches a threshold
level and is executed. Simulation results thus yield a clear
compatibility effect. On average, the compatible trials
require 19.79 cycles (SD: 0.18), neutral trials 25.28 (SD:
0.23) cycles, and incompatible trials 34.04 (SD: 0.73)
cycles. These results ﬁt well with the available behavioral
data (Simon and Rudell 1967) as is shown in Fig. 4.
To understand the source of the compatibility effect in
this model, consider the following compatible trial: a high
tone is presented on the left. This activates the auditory
sensory codes Shigh and Sleft. Activation propagates to the
feature codes Fhigh and Fleft and to task code T1. Because
the task is to respond to high tones with a left key press,
activation ﬂows from T1 to Fleft and from there to M1 (left
response). As soon as the motor activation reaches a
threshold, the action is executed (i.e., the left key is pres-
sed). Now, consider an incompatible trial: a high tone is
presented on the right. This activates the auditory sensory
codes Shigh and Sright. Activation propagates to the feature
codes Fhigh and Fright and to task code T1. Activation ﬂows
from T1 to Fleft. Because both Fleft and Fright are activated,
activation is propagated to both motor codes. As a result,
competition arises at different levels of the model, which
results in a longer response time.
Thus, because common feature codes are used to rep-
resent both stimulus features and response features, stim-
ulus-response compatibility effects are bound to occur. In
the case of this simulation of the Simon effect, although the
location of the stimulus is irrelevant for the task, location is
relevant for the anticipation (thus planning) of the appro-
priate response. Now, the model is, in a sense, forced to
also process the stimulus location and—automatically—
bias the planning of the action response, generating the
Simon effect. Thus, again ideomotor learning is inﬂuenced
by the current task. In addition, automatic interaction
between perception and action causes compatibility effects.
Still, even this automatic interaction arises from the task
that deﬁnes the stimulus features and response (effect)
features that are to be used in planning a response to the
presented stimulus.
Discussion
In this paper, we argue that perception and action are not
only intertwined with regard to their representations, but
may also be intertwined with respect to their processes, in
both humans and artiﬁcial cognitive systems. To demon-
strate this, we have presented a computational model,
HiTEC, which is able to replicate key ﬁndings in psycho-
logical research (Haazebroek et al. submitted). Three
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123processing aspects of the model may be of particular
interest for cognitive robotics: ideomotor learning of action
control, the role of task context and attention, and the
interaction between perception and action. These aspects,
as well as implications for anticipation and affordances—
two important themes in cognitive robotics—are discussed.
Ideomotor learning of action control
The ﬁrst aspect concerns the ideomotor learning of action
control. When working with robots in real-world environ-
ments, it is quite common to assume a predeﬁned set of
(re)actions and let the robot learn whether these actions can
be applied to certain objects (e.g., Cos-Aguilera et al. 2004;
Kraft et al. 2008). However, it is often hard to deﬁne
a priori exactly which actions can be performed by the
robot given the characteristics of the robot body and the
physical environment. Moreover, the same robot body can
have different action capabilities in different (or changing)
environments. Thus, it makes sense not to pre-wire the
actions in the system, but let them be learned by experi-
ence. In our model, we explicitly do not include a known
set of movements. Instead, motor actions are labeled ‘‘M1’’
and ‘‘M2’’ on purpose; only by means of sensorimotor
experience, associations are learned between feature codes
and motor codes, allowing the model to represent its own
actions in terms of the perceived action effects. The model
can subsequently plan a motor action by anticipating (i.e.,
activating the feature codes corresponding to) these per-
ceptual effects (see also the subsection on anticipation).
The theme of ideomotor learning is already quite popular in
the robotics literature (for an overview, see Pezzulo et al.
2006). Note that in our current implementation, we assume
the existence of distal feature codes and let the model learn
connections between these feature codes and motor codes,
rather than between sensory codes and motor codes
directly. We envision that this generalization renders the
acquired ideomotor associations applicable to a variety of
circumstances (i.e., generalizing over objects and over
actions). In addition, ideomotor learning is modulated by
the current task and attentional resources, as described in
the next subsection.
Task context and attention
The second aspect is the inﬂuence of task context and
attention on both perception and action. As is demonstrated
in Simulation 1, internalization of the task instruction not
only speciﬁes the stimulus-response mappings that deter-
mine the perception-cognition-action information ﬂow
from stimulus to response, but also inﬂuences the interac-
tions between perception and action (see next subsection).
Codes that are relevant for stimulus perception and/or
action planning are top-down enhanced. Different task
contexts may weigh different dimensions and features
differently and consequently speed up the stimulus-
response translation process in a way that suits the task
best. Attention is studied quite extensively in cognitive
robotics and is key in active perception strategies (e.g.,
Ognibene et al. 2008).
In HiTEC, feature codes belonging to objects can be
enhanced in activation (in other words: attended to), as can
be features belonging to action effects (in other words:
intended or effect anticipation). Thus, as demonstrated by
Simulation 1, task context can make the system ‘‘pay
attention’’ to those action effects that are important to the
task while attenuating the inﬂuence of irrelevant additional
effects. This processing aspect is crucial when learning
(both in sensorimotor and ideomotor learning) in a com-
plex environment. As cognitive robots are typically able to
track a wealth of sensor readings, it can be hard to deter-
mine which action effects are particularly relevant for
learning (see also the frame problem in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence, Russell and Norvig 1995; Dennett 1984). The
selective attention for elements of the important action
effects still relies on the context such as the task at hand or
on a system that uses internal drives (e.g., Cos-Aguilera
et al. 2004), but the weighting of action effect features may
present an elegant way for a robot system to speciﬁcally
monitor its anticipated action results.
Also, actions are selected based on perceived object
features—following the task level connections—and the
attention for speciﬁc features or feature dimensions applied
to both object perception and action planning. As a con-
sequence, the model does not select actions for a particular
object in a reﬂex-like manner, but it takes the current task
into account, both in object perception and response
selection (see also Hommel 2000).
It is important to note that our conception of ‘‘task’’ is
extremely simpliﬁed and only relates to the current stim-
ulus to response translation rules, neglecting the human
capacity of planning action sequences or even performing
multiple tasks simultaneously (e.g., as modeled in EPIC,
Kieras and Meyer 1997). However, HiTECs task could be
part of a broader deﬁnition of task, including sequences of
actions and criteria for determining whether a task has
ended (see also Pezzulo et al. 2006 for a conceptual anal-
ysis of ideomotor learning and a task-oriented model such
as TOTE).
Interaction between perception and action
The third aspect is the interaction between perception and
action planning as a result of the common coding principle
(Hommel et al. 2001). Feature codes that are used to
cognitively represent stimulus features (e.g., object
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tures. As a result, stimulus-response compatibility effects
can arise, such as the Simon effect that we replicated in
Simulation 2: when a feature code activated by the stimulus
is also part of the features belonging to the correct
response, planning this response is facilitated, yielding
faster reactions. If, on the other hand, the feature code
activated by the stimulus is part of the incorrect response,
this increases the competition between the alternative
responses, resulting in slower reactions. It may appear that
this effect is due to information processing from stimulus
to response only. However, following the HiTEC logic, the
stimulus location only has an effect because location is
relevant for the action. Thus, action planning inﬂuences
object perception. Moreover, while attention plays a role in
‘‘tagging’’ codes to be of importance (whether it is for
stimulus perception or for action planning), the actual
information ﬂow from stimulus to response (effect) is
rather automatic, in a sense bypassing the ‘‘cognitive’’
stage. In robotics, one could envision that perceiving an
object shape already enhances the planning of a roughly
equivalent hand shape. In our model, this is done on a distal
level. That is, a ball-park type of ‘‘equivalent’’ shape is
anticipated. During a reaching movement, the precise hand
shape can be adjusted to the precise shape of the object to
be grasped. Of course, how this is realized exactly should
be subject to further research. Still, the automatic transla-
tion from perceived object features to anticipated action
features seems a promising characteristic with respect to
the notion of affordance (see last subsection).
Anticipation
Numerous cognitive robotics projects include a notion of
‘‘anticipation’’ (see Pezzulo et al. 2008 for an overview).
This is crucial, because in action planning and control it
seems difﬁcult to evaluate all potential variations in
advance, as real data can vary a lot and the behavior of the
environment is not always completely controlled by the
robot. Thus, it seems intuitive to form anticipations on a
distal level. In HiTEC, we adhere to an explicit notion of
anticipation using distal feature codes. Activating these
codes not only helps in action selection or planning, rather
it is how actions are selected and planned in HiTEC. Fol-
lowing the ideomotor principle, the anticipated action
effect activates the associated motor action resulting in
actual action execution. However, how, the action subse-
quently unfolds is not explicitly modeled. By comparing
the anticipated effects with the actually perceived effects,
the system can determine whether the action was suc-
cessful. If there is a discrepancy between the anticipated
and perceived action effect, the model can update its rep-
resentations to learn new action effects or ﬁne-tune action
control (see for more details Haazebroek and Hommel
2009).
Finally, as described in previous subsections, the system
focuses attention on those features that are important for
the current task context, both in object perception and in
action effect perception. Thus, the task context determines
which effect features are especially monitored. This pro-
cess may present opportunities to tackle the frame problem
in artiﬁcial intelligence (Russell and Norvig 1995; Dennett
1984).
Affordances
Roboticists have started to embrace the notion of affor-
dance (after Gibson 1979) in their robot architectures. For
example, Montesano et al. (2008) deﬁne affordances as
links between objects, actions, and effects. It is commonly
assumed that such links are acquired during experience.
Typical setups consist of an exploration phase in which
actions are executed randomly and action success is
determined. Then, object features are correlated with
actions and their success. Finally, for each action, it is
determined which object features are good indications for
their successful execution yielding a set of affordances in
terms of stimulus features—motor actions (S-R) reﬂexes.
In our model, the notion of affordance is effectively
realized by allowing for automatic translation of perceptual
object features (e.g., object shape) to action by means of
overlap with anticipated action effect features (e.g., hand
shape). In this sense, feature codes are representations of
regularities encountered in sensorimotor experience. By
focusing attention on certain action plan features, these
dimensions also become enhanced in object perception. As
a consequence, these sensory features are processed more
strongly than others. Thus, rather than deﬁning affordances
as successful, yet arbitrary, S-R reﬂexes, we deﬁne an af-
fordance in terms of intrinsic overlap between stimulus
features and action effect features as encountered in sen-
sorimotor experience. Indeed, by having common codes,
perceiving objects fundamentally implies anticipating
intrinsically related action plan features. Because of the
ideomotor links, activating features shared by objects and
actions, the system is easily biased to plan and execute
appropriate motor actions. Crucially, the task determines
which (object and action) features are relevant and there-
fore which affordances apply.
Conclusion
We have shown how the HiTEC model can readily repli-
cate key ﬁndings from the perception–action literature
using simulations. These simulations demonstrate three
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robots as they intimately relate to crucial themes as
anticipation and affordances.
It is clear that HiTEC is still limited to simulations of
basic, yet fundamental phenomena in the perception–action
domain. Our main objective was to develop an architecture
that gives an integrated processing account of the interac-
tion between perception and action. However, we envision
that the model could be extended with a variety of capa-
bilities, such as higher ﬁdelity perception and motor action,
as well as episodic and semantic memory capacities. This
way, HiTEC could become a more mature cognitive
architecture (Byrne 2008).
Other extensions may include the processing of affective
information. In reinforcement learning approaches, affec-
tive information is usually treated as additional information
that co-deﬁnes the desirability of a state (i.e., as a
‘‘reward’’) or action alternative (i.e., as part of its ‘‘value’’
or ‘‘utility’’). By weighting action alternatives with this
information (see also the notion of somatic markers,
Damasio 1994), some can turn out to be more desirable
than others, which can aid the process of decision making
(e.g., Broekens and Haazebroek 2007). In psychological
research, studies have shown affective stimulus-response
compatibility effects (e.g., Chen and Bargh 1999; van
Dantzig et al. 2008). Participants are typically faster to
respond to positive stimuli (e.g., the word ‘‘love’’, a picture
of a smiling face) when they perform an approach move-
ment than an avoidance movement. Conversely, they are
faster to respond to negative stimuli (e.g., the word ‘‘war’’,
a picture of a spider) when performing an avoidance
movement than an approach movement. These ﬁndings are
taken as evidence that affective stimuli automatically
activate action tendencies related to approach and avoid-
ance (e.g., Chen and Bargh 1999). Elsewhere (Haazebroek
et al. 2009), we have shown how HiTEC can already
account for such affective stimulus-response compatibility
effects.
Still, HiTEC has not yet been implemented on an actual
robot platform, which would require substantial imple-
mentation effort concerning the grounding of sensory input
and motor output. However, it would also provide a wealth
of opportunities to study and test HiTEC’s processing
aspects in real-world scenarios.
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